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When	US	presidents	push	for	regulatory	reform,
liberal	agency	rules	may	be	first	in	the	firing	line.
One	of	the	concrete	achievements	of	the	Trump	administration	in	the	last	18	months	has
been	the	rapid	removal	of	a	great	deal	of	existing	regulation.	But	what	kinds	of	regulations
tend	to	be	recommended	for	modification	or	removal?	Simon	F.	Haeder	and	Susan
Webb	Yackee	have	studied	the	role	of	the	Office	of	Information	and	Regulatory	Affairs	or
OIRA	in	government	rulemaking	and	find	that	OIRA	frequently	recommends	changes	to
rules	proposed	by	agencies	which	tend	to	lean	to	the	left	politically,	such	as	the
Environmental	Protection	Agency.	As	Trump	moves	to	expand	OIRA’s	powers,	they	warn	that	this	may	have
significant	implications	for	policy	outcomes	felt	across	the	United	States	for	the	years	to	come.
When	President	Trump	entered	the	White	House,	he	had	a	clear	regulatory	reform	agenda.	In	the	President’s	own
words	the	general	goal	was	to	“knock	out	two	regulations	for	every	new	regulation”	in	an	effort	to	get	“back	below	the
1960	level	[of	regulation],	and	we’ll	be	there	fairly	quickly.”
The	Trump	Administration	has	had	some	notable	success	with	its	deregulatory	agenda.		In	the	past	18	months,	it	has
rolled	back	a	number	of	President	Obama-era	regulations	ranging	from	clean	water	and	national	parks	to	energy
production.	And	it	has	moved	to	establish	task	forces	in	federal	agencies	aimed	at	updating,	reducing,	or	eliminating
existing	regulations.	Congressional	Republicans	have	contributed	to	these	efforts,	as	well,	by	using	the
Congressional	Review	Act	(CRA)	sixteen	times	since	Trump	took	office.		Prior	to	the	Trump	presidency,	the	CRA	had
only	been	successfully	invoked	once	since	1996.	The	CRA	allows	Congress	to	undo	recently	issued	regulations	in	an
expedited	fashion.	Crucially,	it	also	prohibits	agencies	from	issuing	similar	regulations	in	the	future	unless	Congress
specifically	authorizes	them	to	do	so.
Yet,	while	meaningful	deregulation	has	occurred	under	the	Trump	Administration,	questions	remain	about	the	true
extent	of	the	phenomenon.	Rolling	back	regulations	is	no	simple	endeavor	due	to	the	relatively	obscure	but	important
US	Administrative	Procedure	Act	of	1946,	which	governs	the	federal	rulemaking	process.	As	we	have	written	here
previously,	most	rulemaking	formally	begins	when	agencies	publish	a	“Notice	of	Proposed	Rulemaking”	(NPRM)	that
solicits	public	comments.		After	considering	those	comments,	the	government	agency	may	then	put	forward	a	legally
binding	“Final	Rule.”		Importantly,	such	a	process	is	needed	for	most	regulatory	and	deregulatory	actions.
Presidents	have	multiple	avenues	to	influence	the	rulemaking	process.	Most	prominently,	they	appoint	agency	heads
and	other	high-level	officials,	often	based	on	their	ideological	congruence.	However,	as	our	previous	and	current
research	indicates,	the	Office	of	Information	and	Regulatory	Affairs	or	OIRA—which	is	an	obscure	office	in	the	White
House—also	plays	a	crucial	role	in	the	rulemaking	process.	This	is	because	before	agencies	may	promulgate	a	Final
Rule,	OIRA	reviews	the	content	of	all	significant	agency	regulations,	including	those	issued	by	agencies	and
departments	like	the	Centers	for	Medicare	&	Medicaid	(CMS)	and	the	US	Department	of	Health	and	Human
Services.	Notably,	as	part	of	its	review	process,	OIRA	is	also	authorized	to	return	these	proposals	with	“suggested
policy	changes,”	so	that	an	agency	can	modify	its	rules	to	better	accord	with	“presidential	priorities”	and	other	goals.
In	recent	work,	we	researched	the	process	by	which	OIRA	reviews	draft	agency	regulations	before	they	are	finalized.
Our	work	covered	more	than	1,500	Final	Rules	reviewed	by	OIRA	between	2005	and	2011	under	Presidents	Bush
and	Obama.	Using	plagiarism	software,	we	also	conducted	a	more	in-depth	analysis	of	a	subset	of	approximately
120	significant	rules.	The	key	question	that	we	sought	to	answer	was	whether	OIRA	was	more	likely	to	request
changes	of	liberal,	neutral,	or	conservative	agencies.	To	determine	agency	ideology,	we	relied	on	two	standard
metrics	based	on	expert	opinions	and	a	survey	of	federal	executives.
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We	found	that	OIRA	frequently	recommends	substantive	changes	to	the	content	of	rules	being	written	across	the
federal	government,	and	we	also	found	that	these	suggested	policy	changes	almost	always	make	it	into	the	text	of
the	finalized	rules.	Moreover,	our	results	suggested	that	OIRA	is	considerably	more	likely	to	recommend	changes	to
rules	being	proposed	by	agencies	believed	to	be	more	left-of-center	in	their	political	orientation,	such	as	the	US
Environmental	Protection	Agency,	than	those	proposed	by	politically	neutral	or	conservative	agencies,	such	as	the
US	Departments	of	Transportation	or	Defense.		We	also	found	that	the	total	amount	of	change	OIRA	requested	of
liberal-leaning	agencies’	rules	is	larger	than	the	amount	requested	of	neutral	and	conservative	agencies’	rules.
Interestingly,	our	study	reveals	that	presidents	from	both	sides	of	the	political	aisle	show	this	tendency.
While	our	research,	by	itself,	does	not	provide	conclusive	evidence	that	OIRA	uses	its	pivotal	position	in	the
regulatory	process	to	systematically	bend	regulation	towards	deregulatory	aims,	our	findings	provide	some	of	the	first
empirical	evidence	on	its	policy	impacts.		This	type	of	evidence	is	critical	as	debates	continue	with	regard	to	whether
OIRA	review	may	open	a	pathway	for	deregulatory	efforts	during	the	rulemaking	process—with	many	OIRA	critics
suggesting	that	those	impacts	are	felt	especially	by	left-of-center	government	agencies.
Moreover,	our	findings	may	hold	particular	importance	under	the	Trump	Administration.	For	example,	one	of
President	Trump’s	first	executive	orders	in	2017	increased	presidential	oversight	over	agency	rulemaking	and
expanded	OIRA’s	regulatory	powers.	Additionally,	there	are	currently	efforts	under	way	in	the	US	Congress	to	extend
OIRA’s	regulatory	oversight	to	independent	regulatory	agencies,	like	the	National	Labor	Relations	Board	and	the
Commodity	Futures	Trading	Commission.	Intended	to	be	more	insulated	from	presidential	pressures,	such	agencies
are	currently	excluded	from	OIRA	review.	Extending	OIRA’s	reach	may	significantly	alter	policy	outcomes	in	these
agencies	and	thereby	change	the	balance	of	powers	in	Washington.
More	generally,	consumer	and	public	interest	groups,	with	their	frequent	calls	for	greater	transparency	in	the
regulatory	process	generally,	and	OIRA	review	in	particular,	may	certainly	find	new	cause	for	concerns	in	our
findings.	This	particularly	holds	in	combination	with	our	previous	work	on	OIRA	which	found	that	business	interests
are	much	more	successful	in	obtaining	policy	changes	from	OIRA	than	public	interest	groups.
Finally,	it	is	worth	noting	that	regulatory	policymaking	has	significantly	increased	in	importance	over	the	past
decades.	And	congressional	stalemate	would	only	further	these	developments.	In	light	of	these	trends,	our	two	OIRA
studies—when	taken	together—as	offer	support	for	the	decades-long	calls	for	greater	transparency	in,	and	greater
understanding	of,	the	US	rulemaking	process.
This	article	is	based	on	the	papers	“Presidentially	Directed	Policy	Change:	The	Office	of	Information	and
Regulatory	Affairs	as	Partisan	or	Moderator?”	in	the	Journal	of	Public	Administration	Research	and	Theory	and
“Influence	and	the	Administrative	Process:	Lobbying	the	US	President’s	Office	of	Management	and	Budget,”	in
USApp – American Politics and Policy Blog: When US presidents push for regulatory reform, liberal agency rules may be first in the firing line. Page 2 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-09-11
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2018/09/11/when-us-presidents-push-for-regulatory-reform-liberal-agency-rules-may-be-first-in-the-firing-line/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/
American	Political	Science	Review.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting	
Note:		This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	USAPP–	American	Politics	and	Policy,	nor	of
the	London	School	of	Economics.		
Shortened	URL	for	this	post:	http://bit.ly/2x6a7dj
About	the	authors
Simon	F.	Haeder	–	West	Virginia	University
Simon	F.	Haeder	is	an	Assistant	Professor	in	the	Department	of	Political	Science	in	the	John	D.
Rockefeller	IV	School	of	Policy	&	Politics	at	West	Virginia	University.	You	can	follow	Simon	on	Twitter
@simonfhaeder.
	
Susan	Webb	Yackee	–	UW-Madison
Susan	Webb	Yackee	is	a	Vilas	Distinguished	Achievement	Professor	of	Political	Science	and	the
Director	of	the	La	Follette	School	of	Public	Affairs	at	UW-Madison.
USApp – American Politics and Policy Blog: When US presidents push for regulatory reform, liberal agency rules may be first in the firing line. Page 3 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-09-11
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2018/09/11/when-us-presidents-push-for-regulatory-reform-liberal-agency-rules-may-be-first-in-the-firing-line/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/
